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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
After being arrested on drug charges, Michael Tappin filed a motion to suppress 
the evidence gathered by the police as a result of a traffic stop. The district court 
denied the motion to suppress. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Tappin then pleaded 
guilty to felony trafficking in heroin. Mr. Tappin's conditional plea reserved his right to 
appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. The district court imposed a 
unified sentence of fifteen years, with ten years fixed. Mr. Tappin appealed, asserting 
that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress, because the officers 
did not have reasonable suspicion to lawfully expand the traffic stop for investigation 
into drug activity, and thus his consent to a search was ineffective. 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State contends that Mr. Tappin's argument was not 
raised to the district court, and Mr. Tappin is therefore precluded from raising the issue 
on appeal; and that application of the correct legal standards to the district court's 
findings of fact showed no error. (Resp. Br., pp.5-10.) 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's contention that Mr. Tappin's 
argument was not raised to the district court, and Mr. Tappin is therefore precluded from 
raising the issue on appeal. Mr. Tappin asserts that the State has failed to establish 
that his issue was not preserved for appeal, because his motion to suppress, by raising 
the overarching issue of whether the officers' traffic stop violated the Fourth 
Amendment, encompassed a dual inquiry into both the inception and the scope and 
duration of the stop. Alternatively, even if this issue had not been raised to the district 
court in Mr. Tappin's motion to suppress, this Court may address his issue on appeal 
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because it was decided by the district court. With regard to the other aspects of this 
case, Mr. Tappin relies on the arguments presented in his Appellant's Brief and will not 
repeat those arguments here. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Tappin's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Has the State failed to establish that Mr. Tappin's issue was not preserved for appeal? 
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ARGUMENT 
The State Has Failed To Establish That Mr. Tappin's Issue Was Not Preserved 
For Appeal 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Tappin asserts that the State has failed to establish that his issue was not 
preserved for appeal. The State contends that Mr. Tappin's argument (that the district 
court erred when it denied his motion to suppress, because the officers did not have 
reasonable suspicion to lawfully expand the traffic stop for investigation into drug 
activity, and thus his consent to a search was ineffective) "was not raised to the district 
court and so may not be considered for the first time on appeal." (Resp. Br., p.7.) The 
State's contention is incorrect. The State has failed to establish that Mr. Tappin's issue 
was not preserved for appeal, because his motion to suppress, by raising the 
overarching issue of whether the officers' traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment, 
encompassed a dual inquiry into both the inception and the scope and duration of the 
stop. Alternatively, this Court may address Mr. Tappin's issue on appeal because it was 
decided by the district court. 
8. Mr. Tappin's Motion To Suppress, By Raising The Overarching Issue Of Whether 
The Officers' Traffic Stop Violated The Fourth Amendment, Encompassed A Dual 
Inquiry Into Both The Inception And The Scope And Duration Of The Stop 
Mr. Tappin asserts that the State has failed to establish that his issue was not 
preserved on appeal, because his motion to suppress, by raising the overarching issue 
of whether the officers' traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment, encompassed a dual 
inquiry into both the inception and the scope and duration of the stop. Therefore, this 
Court may consider his argument that the district court erred when it denied his motion 
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to suppress, because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to lawfully expand 
the traffic stop for investigation into drug activity, and thus his consent to a search 
was ineffective. 
As the State recognizes (Resp. Br., p.7), the Idaho Supreme Court "has held that 
ordinarily issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." State v. DuValt, 131 
Idaho 550, 553 (1998). 
A warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls 
within certain specific and well-delineated exceptions. Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 
833 (2002). "When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the defendant, the 
State bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement 
is applicable." Id. Here, Mr. Tappin demonstrated that the officers initiated the traffic 
stop without a warrant. (R., pp.62-63.) Thus, the State bore the burden to show that a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement is applicable to the traffic stop. See 
Halen, 136 Idaho at 833. 
Traffic stops are seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and are permissible 
under the limited investigatory detention exception to the warrant requirement only 
"when justified by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has 
committed, or is about to commit, a crime." State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 294 P.3d 
1121, 1124 (2013). Here, Mr. Tappin challenged the traffic stop in his motion to 
suppress. (R., pp.56-57.) A motion to suppress challenging a traffic stop raises the 
"overarching issue" of whether the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. See, 
e.g., State v. Lusby, 146 Idaho 506, 509 n.2 (Ct. App. 2008) (''The overarching issue of 
the admissibility of the evidence was raised by [the defendant's] suppression 
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motion .... "), State v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554, 557-58 (Ct. App. 2001) ("[T]he 
overarching 'issue' presented both to the trial court and on appeal was raised by [the 
defendant's] motion . . . . That issue is whether the officers' entry into the motel room 
violated the Fourth Amendment.") 
The analysis of a traffic stop is a dual inquiry involving both the reasonableness 
of the stop at its inception and the reasonableness of the scope and duration of the 
stop. The State acknowledges that "[a]n investigative detention must not only be 
justified at its beginning, but must also be conducted in a manner that is reasonably 
related in scope and duration to the circumstances which justified the interference in the 
first place." (Resp. Br., p.8 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983), 
State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181 (Ct. App. 2004).) Under the "dual inquiry for 
evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop" adopted by the United States 
Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), courts examine "whether the 
officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." United 
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Thus, a motion to suppress challenging a traffic stop, by 
raising the overarching issue of whether the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment, 
necessarily involves a dual inquiry into both the inception and the scope and duration of 
the stop. 
Here, Mr. Tappin's motion to suppress, by raising the overarching issue of 
whether the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment, encompassed a dual inquiry 
into both the inception and the scope and duration of the stop. His motion to suppress 
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asserted the following: "Under the Idaho Constitution, Article I, Section 17, and the 
United States Constitution, Amendment 4, that there was no legal cause to stop, detain 
and arrest the Defendant and therefore, the State's action constituted an unreasonable 
search and seizure." (R., p.57.) The motion to suppress therefore raised the 
overarching issue of whether the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. See 
Lusby, 146 Idaho at 509 n.2, Bower, 135 Idaho at 557-58. 
By raising the overarching issue of whether the traffic stop violated the Fourth 
Amendment, the motion to suppress encompassed a dual inquiry into both the inception 
and the scope and duration of the stop. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682. The State bore 
the burden to show that the traffic stop was permissible under the limited investigatory 
detention exception to the warrant requirement, by demonstrating that the stop was 
justified at its inception and that its scope and duration were reasonably related to the 
circumstances that initially justified the stop. See id., Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 294 P.3d 
at 1124, Halen, 136 Idaho at 833. 
Mr. Tappin's issue on appeal (that the district court erred when it denied his 
motion to suppress, because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to lawfully 
expand the traffic stop for investigation into drug activity, and thus his consent to a 
search was ineffective) deals with the scope and duration of the traffic stop, the second 
part of the dual inquiry. See id. Therefore, this Court may address Mr. Tappin's 
argument as part of the overarching issue, raised by the motion to suppress, of whether 
the officers' traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. The State has failed to 
establish that Mr. Tappin's issue was not preserved for appeal. 
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The State cites State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 161-62 (2000), in support of its 
argument that Mr. Tappin is precluded from raising the issue on appeal. (Resp. 
Br., p.7.) However, this case is distinguishable from Holland. In Holland, the 
defendant's motion to suppress contained "only one ground for suppressing the 
evidence: the per se illegality of a warrantless search." Holland, 135 Idaho at 161. On 
appeal, the defendant argued "her motion to suppress should have been granted 
because [the officer] lacked probable cause to stop the car she was riding in." Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the defendant in Holland "did not 
expressly raise the issue of the stop in the trial court," because "[a] challenge to a 
warrantless search . . . does not automatically bring into issue the justification of the 
initial stop." Id. Further, the Court concluded that "the issue of the stop was also not 
properly raised before the district judge," because the defendant's counsel withdrew the 
line of questioning about the grounds for the stop during cross-examination of the 
State's witness, and did not provide the judge with any legal or factual argument as to 
why the State's evidence was insufficient to justify the stop. Id. "Based upon these few 
passing references to the issue," the Court could not find "that the issue was actually 
argued to the district court." Id. Thus, the Holland Court decided that the "challenge to 
the stop constitutes a new issue that cannot be raised on appeal." Id. 
Conversely, Mr. Tappin expressly raised the issue of the traffic stop to the district 
court. Unlike the defendant in Holland, 135 Idaho at 161, Mr. Tappin did not raise 
alternative grounds for suppression for the first time on appeal. He did not challenge 
the search in district court and then only on appeal challenge the traffic stop. Cf 
Holland, 135 Idaho at 161. Rather, Mr. Tappin's motion to suppress and argument on 
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appeal contain the same ground for suppressing the evidence, i.e., that the officers' 
traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. (R., pp.56-57, App. Br., pp.6-13.) Thus, 
this case is distinguishable from Holland, because Mr. Tappin expressly raised the issue 
of the traffic stop to the district court. 
C. Alternatively, The District Court May Address Mr. Tappin's Issue On Appeal 
Because It Was Decided By The District Court 
Alternatively, Mr. Tappin asserts that even if this issue had not been raised to the 
district court in his motion to suppress, this Court may address his issue on appeal 
because it was decided by the district court. 
As discussed above, "ordinarily issues cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal." DuValt, 131 Idaho at 553. "An exception to this rule, however, has been 
applied by this Court when the issue was argued to or decided by the trial court." Id. 
(citing Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351, 356-57 (1990)). 
In DuValt, the State argued that the defendant's issue of whether the use of 
handcuffs on the defendant was a reasonable means to execute an investigatory stop 
"may not be raised on appeal because it was not raised to the trial court." Id. However, 
the district court in DuValt "stated that '[d]efendant contends that he was illegally 
arrested when he was handcuffed and patted down . . . The handcuffing during this 
investigatory stop was a reasonable means to execute the investigatory stop."' Id. The 
Idaho Supreme Court concluded that, "[s]ince this issue was directly addressed by the 
trial court below, we will decide this issue on appeal." Id. 
Similarly, in this case the issue of whether the officers had reasonable suspicion 
to lawfully expand the traffic stop for investigation into drug activity and the 
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effectiveness of Mr. Tappin's consent to search was decided by the district court. Here, 
the district court concluded that "[o]nce the stop occurred, nothing precluded the officer 
from asking [Mr. Tappin] for his consent to a search." (R., p.78.) That statement 
indicates that the district court considered whether the expansion of the traffic stop for 
investigation into drug activity had any effect on Mr. Tappin's consent. Because the 
issue raised by Mr. Tappin was, at the least, indirectly addressed by the district court, 
this Court may decide the issue on appeal. See DuValt, 131 Idaho at 553. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Tappin respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of 
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 25th day of June, 2013. 
~ r ~ --~----
BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY~ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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